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Four artisanal and small-scale mining organisations 
(ASMOs) producing gold in Uganda have been subjected 
to a value chain analysis, showing that they currently lack 
access to any legal market channels. Despite receiving high 
per gram prices for their gold on the illegal market, these 
organisations do not trust current trade partners regarding 
the measurements of weight and purity and end up making 
meagre profits due to high maintenance and production 
costs. 
Opportunities for an alternative route-to-market model 
have been explored in an effort to improve the producer 
community’s livelihood. The proposed system builds on; 
1) an assurance and export mechanism utilizing blockchain 
traceability, 2) the provision of technical training and 3) 
on-the-spot payments. The most important aspect of 
making this system attractive to producer groups will be 
the provision of technical processing and mining 
equipment to boost efficiency, productivity and 
profitability. Through improved productivity and 
efficiency, ASMOs will benefit most from ethical sourcing 
ambitions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to a recent study and official export statistics, 
Uganda has experienced a stark increase in gold production 
in past years (Mthembu-Salter, 2015). Artisanal and small-
scale (ASM) producers account for all national production 
as there are currently no large-scale gold mines in 
operation, while “up to 50,000 artisanal gold miners, 
women, men and children” (Schipper, et al., 2016) make 
their living searching for and processing the precious metal 
that ends up in electronics, jewellery and bullion around the 
globe. 
In an attempt to connect traditionally vulnerable producer 
groups with the international market for ethically produced 
ASM gold, an in-depth value chain analysis (VCA) has 
been conducted. The study focused on a community of four 
ASM groups located in the village of Tiira, Busia district, 
close to the Kenyan border. From this a model value chain 
has been developed to link producer groups logistically to 
downstream actors located in the global south. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The research underlying this paper has been conducted 
following the academic framework of Trienekens’ (2011) 3-
Step Value Chain Analysis Approach: 1. Conducting a 
Value Chain Analysis 2. Identifying Constraints within the 
value chain 3. Formulating recommendations for value 
chain upgrades. 
This effort built on analysis of existing academic research 
regarding market access of ASM producer organisations, 
voluntary sustainability standards’ requirements, NGO 
reports and other grey literature. 
Given the case-specific nature of this research and the 
informality of the sector, as well as the nature of the 
commodity and the fact that ASM gold trade is a topic yet to 
be fully explored in academia, interviews have formed the 
main basis for this research.  
Furthermore, visits of the four mines, engagement with the 
Ugandan authority in charge of ASM and gold production, 
forwarding agents and insurance companies as well as with 
local capacity builders and traders located in Kampala have 
provided an insight to the local reality on the ground. 
The interviews with experts and value chain actors have 
informed the design of the proposed assurance, aggregation 
and export mechanism. The field research underlying this 
synthesis report has been conducted January to April 2018. 
 
RESULTS OF THE VALUE-CHAIN-ANALYSIS 
Producer groups were expected to sell their gold at a local 
level, as it is the case in the neighbouring Karamoja region, 
where ASM organizations (ASMOs) are receiving roughly 
55% of the gold’s value in reference to the global gold price 
set by the LBMA in London (Barreto et al., 2018). The 
miners interviewed for this study, however, expose 
themselves to high risk travelling to and from the capital, as 
Kampala traders offer up to 97% of the LBMA price 
factoring in both weight and purity. 
Since national royalty payments for the gold are set at 5% of 
the gold's LBMA value, Kampala traders must either operate 
at a constant loss or, more likely, illegally. Despite the highly 
competitive buying prices officially paid, all producer groups 
voiced concerns about the accuracy of weight and purity 
measurements used to determine the final price. Inaccurate, 
rigged scales are one such tactic employed by Uganda’s 
traders (Barreto et al., 2018). 
Price vs Profit 
Public discourse about fair and ethical trade most often 
evolves around producers’ prices and market access. This 
case study has found that the more urgent debate, in this 
case, should revolve around the producers’ profit margins, 
as current production practices lead to a profit distribution, 
where, of the alleged 97% currently paid by the buyers, less 
  
than 6% remained as profit to be distributed as wages for 
workers due to the high production costs.  
 
With 44.5% of their revenue spent on fuel, lubricant and 
spare parts, running equipment is by far the most 
significant cost factor. The high-interest rate on working 
capital and investors operating under exploitative terms 
prevent the miners from accumulating wealth, and many 
miners live a hand-to-mouth existence. 
 
An intervention attempting to connect ASM producers 
directly to downstream actors might not be able to 
outcompete Kampala trading prices, but should evolve 
around helping 1) decrease productions costs, while 2) 
offering local buying and 3) immediate payments; building 
up 4) mutual trust through transparency. 
 
One way of supporting ASMOs increase productivity is 
through the 5) provision of access to adequate equipment 
and 6) training on how to operate these machines. 
Efforts of legalisation – Applying for Mining Licenses 
Two of the four producer groups researched operate having 
their mining license in place, which allows them to extract 
the minerals from the plot registered in their name, under 
the condition of paying royalties on all its production. 
 
The other two ASMOs reported difficulties receiving legal 
licenses, as the process of applying is exceptionally non-
transparent.  
The Ugandan government body in charge of gold mining 
and ASM, the Directorate for Geological Surveys and 
Mining (DGSM) stands accused of systemic corruption 
materialising in location licenses and mining permits being 
handed out not to the most suitable candidate, but patrons 
of both high- and low-ranking officials, in addition to not 
enforcing royalty payments from selected license holders. 
International watchdog Global Witness reports that even 
though allegations were brought to the attention of high-
ranking officials, no action has been taken to bring more 
transparency into the matter (Global Witness, 2017). 
 
The design of the organisational structure of the DGSM is 
such that preferential treatment and bribery can happen 
without fear of indictment from other departments. Many 
countries have separate institutions for the processing of 
license applications (usually done by the Ministry of 
Mining) and environmental inspections of the mining 
companies that have already received a license to operate 
(usually conducted by the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection). The DGSM, however, is responsible for both 
licensing and environmental inspections, and so there is no 
system of checks and balances. 
 
Current export through the African Gold Refinery 
A significant share of the gold officially exported from 
Uganda is processed by the African Gold Refinery (AGR), 
a Belgium-Ugandan business venture located near Entebbe 
International Airport. AGR received substantial foreign 
investment in early 2017 in an attempt to create 
government revenue through in-country value addition. 
Co-run by former high-ranking government officials and 
with ties to the president’s family, “the company is able to 
out compete other legal traders on price because it enjoys 
a 10-year tax holiday from the government for adding 
value to Uganda’s gold. This is an exemption granted to 
companies that add value on minerals in Uganda before 
exporting them” (Muhumuza, 2016). 
 
Global Witness claims that the African Gold Refinery “has 
processed and exported over USD 200 million worth of 
gold, paying only half a million dollars in tax”, but does not 
disclose the origins of this gold (Global Witness, 2017). 
Global Witness accuses the refinery of deliberately failing 
to publish provenance information, because it sources from 
Sudan and the DRC, which are high risk areas, and should 
be subject to high levels of scrutiny. On top of these 
allegations, Global Witness quotes correspondence with the 
Commissioner of the DGSM dating back to January 2017, 
stating that the DGSM “has not issued any export permits” 
to the AGR. 
 
Contraband Gold & Illegal Exports 
While a small part of the increase in national gold 
production can be attributed to a gold rush in recent years 
(Schipper et al., 2016), the largest share is most probably 
the result of AGR processing and exporting gold 
originating from neighbouring countries, most of which is 
likely to be contraband gold from DRC, Sudan and 
Rwanda (Mthembu-Salter, 2015). 
 
Much of the contraband gold that leaves the country 
illegally is said to be smuggled on to Dubai, where it is 
processed and often sold on to India. The most common 
route for contraband gold seems to be the land route to Port 
Mombasa in Kenya, as illegal export via roadways is hard 
to regulate. Mthembu-Salter (2015) however, reports to the 
OECD that Entebbe International Airport officials engage 
in air smuggling of gold as hand luggage and even as cargo. 
Gold traders often have various informal arrangements 
with airport security officials to facilitate the smooth (and 
illegal) export of gold (Blore, 2015). 
A business inquiry, as part of this research investigation, 
for services of a forwarding agent substantiated these 
claims, as the forwarding agent specified that more than 
half of his USD 400 fee is spent on paying airport staff to 
speed up the process of clearing and guaranteeing a secure 
transaction (Interview with Forwarding Agent, March 
2018). 
 
High levels of corruption, a systematic lack of trust among 
value chain actors and the secrecy and complexity of the 
gold sector, are likely to hinder a successful reform of 
existing practices working with, rather than against, 
existing traders and middle men. 
Learning from existing Examples 
The examples of ASM communities already supplying the 
international market are rare and mainly limited to certified 
producer groups audited against either the Fairmined 
Standard for Precious Metals of the ARM or the equivalent 
standard of Fairtrade. 
 
These mines are exclusively located in South America and 
Mongolia and are, generally speaking, of high 
organisational capacity. These ASMOs produce sufficient 
volume to have direct supply relationships with refiners 
located in the Global North. A representative of some of 
the certified mines in Colombia it was stated that the 
minimum amount to break-even on the transport costs and 
enable direct international trade lies at approximately 
1.5kg of gold per consignment (Interview with 
representative standard setting body, March 2018). 
 
In Colombia, the gold is transported by armoured, safe-
transport, cash transit vehicles, collecting the gold directly 
from the producers. The gold usually gets smelted at the 
ASMO’s facility and is already in the form of doré bars. 
 
It is worth noting that there are currently less than ten 
mines that are certified and directly linked to a refinery, 
none of which are located in Africa. African ASM gold 
producers are usually less well-developed, with less 
infrastructure and organisational capacity and produce 
far smaller volumes. An inclusive market mechanism 
does currently not seem to exist, allowing producers with 
low production volumes to sell their gold directly to 
refiners. 
 
Building mutual Trust: Transparency of Information 
London-based traceability-solutions provider Everledger 
has pioneered the application of blockchain technology 
in the diamond sector, including more than a million 
individual diamonds in a reliable digital tracking system 
providing real-time data on the location and status of 
every stone (Everledger, 2018). 
 
Blockchain technology in itself is merely a way of storing 
and transmitting data in a manner that various parties are 
permitted to access data in real time while being unable 
to alter any of the information recorded onto the 
Blockchain. In other words, it is a shared immutable and 
decentralised ledger for documenting the history of 
transactions of any kind, be it payments, geolocation 
data, time stamps or the physical transfer of ownership. 
 
Everledger has successfully applied this technology to 
the diamond sector, making it possible for the end-
consumer to revisit the entire journey of his or her stone 
from mine to jeweller. 
 
In general, this system could be applied to any high-value 
commodity and has even been used to make provenance 
claims for products such as single origin coffee, cotton or 
tuna. A blockchain is, however, only a way of storing and 
transmitting data, and relies on accurate data input along 
the supply chain to be of use. If deployed correctly, a 
Blockchain-based solution would enable any 
downstream company to receive and share reliable Chain 
of Custody (CoC) assurances with the next value chain 
actor. 
Understanding Downstream Requirements 
Interviews with various downstream actors resulted in a 
list of requirements ASMOs and supply chain actors 
would need to meet to allow for a direct buyer-seller 
relationship between a European refinery and the 
producer organisations in Tiira. In summary, these 
include compliance with the OECD's Due Diligence 
Criteria for precious metals from areas of conflict, as well 
as the LBMA's Sourcing Criteria and the Responsible 
Jewellery Council’s (RJC) ASM Chain of Custody 
criteria. 
 
All of these criteria are achievable, if a monitoring 
system was in place, ensuring the absence of child and 
forced labour as well as transparency regarding the 
financial flow of money paid to the producer groups. 
The Impact Facility’s Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) Performance Monitoring and 
Assurance system suffices to meet these criteria fully. The 
Impact Facility, the commissioner of this research, is a 
charity set up to support mining communities and further 
inclusive development of mining communities. Its ESG 
criteria’s Basic Level has been designed in alignment with 
the minimum requirements for ASM gold sourcing, 
outlined by the leading voluntary sustainability standards 
and international sourcing requirementsrlevant to the ASM 
gold sector. 
 
More concretely, these criteria require an ASMO to: 
• be legally registered in the application process 
• keep production and sales records 
• not employ any child labourers under the age of 15 in line 
with ILO Convention 182 and 137 
• respect workers’ rights 
• attempt to abstain from mercury use 
• provide proof of tax/royalty payment 
• and commit to continuous improvement regarding a 
range of ESG risks & challenges. 
 
Proposed Value Chain Intervention  
Establishing a traceable, reasonably-risk-free and ethical 
value chain connecting mining communities directly with 
refineries in the Global North requires the following value 
chain actors to be directly involved: 
 
• ASMOs 
• A local buyer & smelter 
• Secure transport providers 
• Clearing agents 
• An international airline 
• A refinery 
 
Operational Environment & Preconditions 
Downstream companies require credible assurances 
regarding the origin of the gold and the circumstances of 
production. The ESG assessment program of The Impact 
Facility, which is executed by local implementing partners 
and monitored by The Impact Facility staff meets criteria 
laid out by the relevant international standards. While such 
an effort requires significant financial investment, The 
Impact Facility finds itself in a position where the data is 
already readily available, due to its ongoing engagement 
with the mining communities. 
This information will be kept and updated in a digital 
system, built on Everledger’s Blockchain technology. 
With this system in place, the gold can be geo-tracked in 
real-time, providing information regarding the 
provenance, the selling party and the circumstances of 
production (using quarterly updated data). The underlying 
IT-system records every time the gold changes hands; with 
such a system in place, an international insurance company 
voiced its willingness to ensure the transport from Busia 
up to the location of the refinery against any form of loss 
or theft. 
 
Agreeing on joint terms for downstream-support and trade  
By forging direct relationships between downstream 
companies interested in the offtake of ethically produced 
gold and willing to provide access to capital in the form of 
equipment, The Impact Facility can help ASMOs achieve 
higher productivity and profitability. Downstream actors 
interested in the sourcing of gold, however, are interested 
in a reciprocal arrangement, as they want to use the gold 
in their supply chains. 
It is essential to achieve a joint understanding with the 
miners that rather than focusing on getting the highest 
possible price for their gold (selling it to the illegal 
market), the ASMOs would benefit more from cutting 
production costs by increasing productivity and boosting 
production volumes. 
If ASMOs are willing to commit to selling their gold via 
this local buying and aggregating system, miners will 
reap the benefits of both capacity building and access to 
adequate machines. 
 
Proposed Value Chain Process 
The proposed system could accommodate paying the 
miners a price equivalent to 93-95% of the LBMA world 
market price, buying gold locally and thus, reducing the 
risk of travelling far distances with their valuable cargo 
and deceitful business practices for the producers. 
The use of tamper-proof boxes in conjunction with a 
rigorous monitoring process, allows downstream 
companies to meet all due diligence criteria necessary. 
The most important aspect of making this system 
attractive to producer groups will be the provision of 
technical processing and mining equipment to boost 
efficiency, productivity and profitability. Through 
improved productivity and efficiency, ASMOs will 
benefit most from ethical sourcing ambitions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The ASMOs in Uganda do currently not have the option 
of legitimate market access via legally operating value 
chain actors. Corruption in the institutional environment 
makes it difficult for ASMOs to operate legally. 
Companies committed to buying ethically produced 
ASM gold will need to invest in constant monitoring to 
meet international due diligence requirements. Producer 
groups, on the other hand, will need to understand that 
organisational transparency and ESG performance 
monitoring are the keys to building mutual trust. Direct 
collaboration with downstream actors will enable them to 
access finance and capacity building and thus to improve 
productivity and profitability. 
The success of any intervention would depend on the 
development mutual trust and a joint commitment to 
collaborate on achieving better production practices in 
terms of productivity, but also regarding various ESG 
criteria. 
Building on the insights gained from this research, The 
Impact Facility and its downstream partners are currently 
preparing to pilot the proposed aggregation and export 
mechanism in spring 2019.  
The full value chain analysis report can be found at: 
https://www.impactfacility.com/blog/asm-gold-vca-uganda 
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David Sturmes was an undergraduate student under the 
supervision of Ard Schoemaker when the research in this 
report was performed. The topic was commissioned by 
Assheton S. Carter of the The Impact Facility, a global grant 
and investment vehicle focused on supporting ASM 
communities. The design and execution of the research was 
done by the student, including field visits in Tiira Uganda, 
conducting expert interviews as well as the processing of the 
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